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PHILOSOPHIE

Enseignement Teaching Unterricht

XVIII^e Congrès International de l'AIPPh 2009

Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte (ISVW)
Leusden (NL)

Identité : Nationale, européenne ou mondiale

Identität : National, europäisch oder global

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des Professeurs de Philosophie**

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des Professeurs de Philosophie**

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XVIIIe Congrès Internatinal de l'AIPPh 2009

XVIII. Internationaler Kongress der AIPPh 2009

XVIII. International Congress of AIPPh 2009

**Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte (ISVW)
Dodeweg 8, NL 3832RD Leusden**

30.10.2009 – 1.11.2009

Identité: Nationale, européenne ou mondiale?

Identität: National, europäisch oder global....?

Identity: National, European or global ?

**Comment la philosophie et l'enseignement de la philosophie
peuvent contribuer à gagner nos identités**

**Wie die Philosophie und der Philosophieunterricht zu unseren
Identitäten beitragen können**

**How philosophy and philosophy teaching can contribute to get
meaningful identities**

Les conférences

Die Vorträge

Lectures

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Préface – Vorwort – Preface

Un congrès ne perd pas son importance, si le sujet est intéressant encore après des années. La question comment se comprendre dans son identité intellectuelle, personnelle, familiale et culturelle reste un problème de nos jours parce que notre monde continue de se globaliser par chaque avion que nos industries construisent. Il semble être tellement difficile de supporter les différences humaines et traditionnelles dans nos sociétés en dépit de l'augmentation de nos voyages.

Voilà une collection des conférences principales du congrès « Identité : Nationale, européenne ou mondiale – Comment la philosophie et l'enseignement de la philosophie peuvent contribuer à gagner nos identités » à Leusden dans «Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte» (ISVW) du novembre 2009, qui peuvent éclaircir certainement ce problème énigmatique de l'identité.

Paul Scheffer remarque qu'un cosmopolitisme abstrait ne suffit pas à remplir une identité réelle dans nos grandes villes multiculturelles. Au contraire, il nous faut exercer un art de traduction d'une réalité individuelle dans celle d'un autrui. Riccardo Pozzo nous rappelle qu'il nous reste la tâche de conserver et développer notre souvenir commun dans la forme de nos textes essentiels de l'humanité en les faisant utilisables universellement par des technologies moderne. Gabriele Münnix démontre que la condition vitale d'un autre n'est compréhensible dans un sens réaliste que par une multiperspectivité un reconnaissant que l'autre reste toujours l'étranger. Pourtant, comprendre un autre peut se développer et doit être renforcé et entraîné souvent par des changements des perspectives. Vera Anatol'nevna donne un exemple de recherche sur les valeurs spécifiques des jeunes dans un monde toujours changeant des circonstances de vie, pendant que Anna Hogenová explique l'importance de la langue personnelle qui est fondée profondément dans l'être humain en contraste d'une langue technique et internationaliste. À la fin Riccardo Sirello communique dans quelle forme l'internet peut contribuer à une identité de nos jours et quels obstacles nous y trouvons.

Nous remercions l'ISVW pour la réalisation du congrès ici documenté et souhaitons beaucoup de plaisir et de gain pendant la lecture.

Ein Kongress verliert nicht seine Bedeutung, wenn das gewählte Thema noch nach Jahren interessant ist. Die Frage, wie man seine intellektuelle, persönliche, familiäre und kulturelle Identität verstehen soll, bleibt bestehen, weil sich unsere Welt mit jedem Flugzeug, das unsere Industrie ausliefert, mehr globalisiert. Es scheint so schwierig zu sein, die menschlichen und traditionellen Unterschiede in unseren Gesellschaften trotz der immer größeren Zahl von Reisen auszuhalten.

Hier liegt nun eine Sammlung der Hauptvorträge des Kongresses „Identität: National, europäisch oder global – Wie Philosophie und Philosophieunterricht zu unseren Identitäten beitragen können“, vorabgehalten im November 2009 in der „Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte“ in Leusden, die sicherlich dieses rätselhafte Problem der Identität erhellen können.

Paul Scheffer merkt an, dass ein abstrakter Kosmopolitismus nicht ausreicht, um die reale Identität in unseren großen multikulturellen Städten auszufüllen. Im Gegenteil müssen wir eine Kunst ausüben, nämlich eine individuelle Wirklichkeit in die eines anderen zu übersetzen. Riccardo Pozzo erinnert uns daran, dass uns die ständige Aufgabe bleibt, unser kollektives Gedächtnis zu bewahren und weiter zu entwickeln, indem wir die wesentlichen Texte der Menschheit mit Hilfe der modernen Technologien universal nutzbar machen. Gabriele Münnix zeigt auf, dass die Lebenswirklichkeit eines anderen in einem realistischen Sinne nur mit Hilfe von Multiperspektivität zu verstehen ist, indem man anerkennt, dass der andere immer der Fremde bleibt. Besseres Verständnis hingegen kann sich entwickeln und muss vielfach durch Einübung von Perspektivwechseln befördert werden. Vera Anatol'evna gibt ein Beispiel für die Forschung über spezifische Werte junger Leute in einer Welt mit ständig wechselnden Lebensverhältnissen, während Anna Hogenová die Bedeutung der persönlichen Sprache im Gegensatz zu einer technischen und internationalistischen erklärt. Schließlich zeigt uns Riccardo Sirello, in welcher Form das Internet zu einer zeitgemäßen Identität beitragen kann und welche Hindernisse wir dort finden.

Wir danken dem ISVW für die Durchführung des hier dokumentierten Kongresses und wünschen bei der Lektüre viel Vergnügen und Gewinn.

A conference held in the past is still relevant when its chosen theme has not lost any of its interest. The question how to grasp our intellectual, personal, familial and cultural identities remains a pertinent one, because the world becomes more globalised with every airplane built by our industries. Despite increasing global travel, it still appears so hard to come to grips with the distinctions dictated by people and traditions in our various societies.

The present volume contains the keynote lectures of the conference on Identity: National, European or Global – How Philosophy and Philosophy *Courses may contribute to our Identities*, held in the International School of Philosophy in Leusden in November 2009. From their several perspectives, all contributions help to clarify this enigmatic problem of identity.

Paul Scheffer observes that an abstract cosmopolitanism alone is not sufficient to realize a real identity in our large multicultural cities. If anything, we must practise the art of translating one's individual reality into that of another person. Riccardo Pozzo reminds us that it is our permanent duty to preserve and develop our collective memory by putting humanity's essential texts to universal use with the aid of modern technologies. Gabriele Münnix shows that another person's everyday reality can only be truly understood from the point of multiperspectivity, by acknowledging that the other will always remain a stranger. Better understanding however can develop and has to be fostered by practising changes of perspectives as often as possible. Vera Anatol'evna offers an example of the research into specific juvenile values in a world in which conditions of life constantly change, while Anna Hogenová explains the meaning of a personal language as opposed to a technical and internationalist one. Finally Riccardo Sirello demonstrates in what form the internet may contribute to a modern-day identity and the obstacles to be encountered in the process.

We wish to thank the International School of Philosophy for facilitating the conference here documented. We hope the volume may provide both profit and enjoyment to the reader.

Breda and Melsdorf/Kiel, September 2011

Miriam van Reijen

Werner Busch

Paul Scheffer

The global village and its citizens

My grandfather Herman Wolf came from Germany around the turn of the century. Being from a Jewish family his passion was German philosophy and literature. He wrote in the fateful year 1933: 'This is the problematic, indeed tragic situation of the humanist in our time: he is deeply convinced that believing in the unique value of race, volk, party can lead to the most horrible violation of what is human. But he does not know how to clarify this conviction in concrete forms and symbols; he must always witness how others who claim to speak in the name of blood, race, volk, church and party find millions of followers and believers, while he is accused of weakness and ambivalence, because he can only speak in 'vague and floating concepts' about the 'potential unity' of mankind, the 'autonomy of the person', 'the community of peoples' and 'a universal religion'.'

His question has been on my mind for many years while writing about Europe and about immigration as part of a globalizing world. A different time, for sure, but the question remains. What could cosmopolitanism possibly mean in our time, that is to say: can we transcend the opposition of romanticism and enlightenment, or to put it differently, can we localize the world citizen? Cosmopolitanism begins perhaps with taking now and then a trip with the underground or a busride outside the boulevard périphérique. In cities like Rotterdam, Lyon, Birmingham, Malmo, where more than hundred different nationalities live, it means being not only curious about your neighbours, but feeling an obligation towards them. We have seen too much provincialism of the well to do - who can find their way in the metropolis of the world - that is provoking another provincialism of the less well to do - who are losing their way in the places were they're living.

Being a world citizen means first of all understanding that the ideal of an open society is vulnerable in an era of globalization. We see everywhere how freedom is undermined in the name of a longing for security. It means understanding the sense of loss that globalization brings with it: many have the feeling that the world as they knew it is slipping away. And they resist this with passion. That is not innocent, because the moment we try to repair longing with belonging, the apprehension of loss with a rediscovery of identity, we often part ways and put an end to mutual understanding.

An open society is always an invitation to look beyond the affirmation of ethnic and religious identities, to confront majorities and minorities with their prejudices and see that we are dependent on each other, reciprocity, as James Baldwin once wrote in *The fire next time*: 'I short, we, the black and the white, deeply need each other here if we are really to become a nation – if we are really that is, to achieve our identity, our maturity, as men and woman. To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need to create two, one black and one white'. He concluded: 'What it comes to is that if we, who can scarcely be considered a white nation, persist in thinking of ourselves as one, we condemn ourselves to sterility and decay, whereas if we could accept ourselves *as we are*, we might bring new life to the Western achievements, and transform them.'

Cosmopolitanism means understanding that cultures always live with a sense of continuity and creativity. When one does not accept that continuity, if we disown our own history, than what we see is a growing polarization between those who profess openness and creativity and those who cling to a certain idea of their heritage. A living democracy tries to combine, not reconcile, tolerance and loyalty, heritage and openness, and tries to prevent these two attitudes from drifting apart.

Manuel Castells observes in a different way the same fundamental rupture of our time: 'It opposes the cosmopolitanism of the elite, living on a daily connection to the whole world, to the tribalism of local communities, retrenched in their spaces that they try to control as their last stand against the macro forces that shape their lives out of their reach'. He adds: 'The most important challenge to be met in European cities is the articulation of the globally oriented economic functions of the city with the locally rooted society and culture.'

We have to find the ways in a local setting to transcend this feeling of loss and transform it in a real acceptance of a world that forces us more and more to see a common destiny. For sure, the financial crisis, the environment, armed conflicts, genocide are an invitation to act together. But it always begins by articulating the idea of an open society at home, otherwise we will never reach a point where majorities will chose an open way to compromise across borders, to see their destiny as dependent upon others.

If Europe is to be united in a cosmopolitan spirit, it has to be rooted in local democracies. Being a world citizen means crossing borders while understanding that there are borders. Cosmopolitanism is the art of translation, and everyone who has been translated knows how difficult it is for ideas to travel. How difficult it is not to get lost in

translation. What irritates me in today's discourse about cosmopolitanism is the complacency and laziness, not accepting the effort that it takes to understand a different culture.

Let me end by referring to the sceptical comment of Rousseau, the French philosopher who once wrote: 'Distrust these cosmopolitans who are looking in the depths of their books for the obligations that they refuse to accept for those living around them. These philosophers love the Tartarians because it gives them an excuse not to love their neighbours'.

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Riccardo Pozzo

Philosophy Teaching in the World Reality, Problems, and a Perspective

1. REALITY

The 2009 AIPPh conference dedicated to “How philosophy and philosophy teaching can contribute to get meaningful identities” serves well for the purpose of collecting materials for a survey on philosophy teaching in different countries. The 2009 UNESCO World Philosophy Day was on “Philosophy in the Dialogue of Cultures”. The issue was identity, cultural identity. The FISP Committee for the Teaching of Philosophy has prepared a volume of articles on the teaching of the history of philosophy, a second volume on intercultural history of philosophy shall appear shortly. The committee is the largest of the *Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie* (FISP) operative committees. Its members are: Riccardo Pozzo (Chair), Jean Ferrari, Gholamreza Aavani, Joseph C.A. Agbakoba, Tomas Calvo-Martínez, Betül Çotuksöken, Thalia Fung Riveron, Gilbert Hottois, Ivan Kaltchev, Peter Kemp, Ioanna Kuçuradi, Dermot B. Moran, Hans Poser, Lourdes Velazquez, Stelios Virvidakis. External members are Nadia Boccara and Jean Leclercq.

1.1 Philosophy in High Schools

“The task of philosophy in schools” is the title of vol. 3 of the AIPPh series. I am here, for I have to learn from you all. I am very proud of the experience I had as a high school teacher in Italy from 1995 to 1996. In Italy, a university reform bill, *Legge Gelmini 240/2010*, was approved by Parliament on December 30, 2010, which bears substantial implications as regards teachers’ education. In September of 2010 we knew of a handbook, which on the basis of the 2008 budget law assigned to the universities the education of starting teachers. The handbook appeared to be ready for print in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale* (although some attachments were missing). To date, however, it has not gone into print. The point is that determining the course of studies future high-school philosophy teachers are expected to follow remains a crucial problem, which

cannot be lost in silence, for it is very important to make a qualified disciplinary curriculum for future philosophy teachers possible.

1.2 The Italian Case

The *Legge Gelmini 240/2010* declares higher education institutions to be “primary seat of free research and free education.” Obviously, everybody wishes to consider and verify how to preserve and defend this freedom of research and teaching. The reform-law’s impact is not assessable yet, due to the high number of competences that it assigns to the *Ministero dell’Istruzione, Università e Ricerca Scientifica* (MIUR) and to the government itself, competences that are quite substantial: (a) special resources allocation (art. 4); (b) boosting quality and efficiency of the university system (art. 5); (c) determination of the “areas of specialization” for the new tenure track procedure on the basis of a “national scientific habilitation” (art. 15); (d) accreditation of doctoral programs (art. 19); (e) appointment of committees for evaluating and funding research projects (art. 20); (f) criteria for evaluating candidates for non-tenure-track positions (art. 24); (g) salary raises for professors and researchers (art. 8). The reform bill has instituted a new evaluation agency, the *Agenzia Nazionale di Valutazione del Sistema Universitario e della Ricerca* (ANVUR), which places itself alongside with the already existing *Consiglio Universitario Nazionale* (CUN). It is baffling to notice that while the law mentions twenty times the ANVUR, it mentions only thrice the CUN. It might be a meaningless frequency figure. The fact is, though, that the CUN is an elected board, the expression of the scientific community as a whole, which elects its representatives. On the contrary, the seven ANVUR board members are in their totality MIUR appointees, which leaves doubts open about their independence. First and foremost, the absence of a humanities representative within the ANVUR board is a not good auspice as regards the government’s intents in this domain. Committees are at work to write new programs. We are in flux. The point is: better to have something than to have nothing. If this is the perspective, in Italy we have been privileged: since the reform bill promoted in 1923 by the idealistic philosopher Giovanni Gentile, philosophy has been reserved two week-hours for three years in both Humanistic and Scientific Gymnasia. Beginning with the last decades of the last century, philosophy teaching has been extended to a number of further orders of schools. Students have the chance of receiving a formal introduction to philosophy, which in Italy is structured historically: first year ancient and medieval (Tales to Nicholas of Cusa), second modern (Valla to Kant), and third contemporary (Fichte to Derrida). Philosophy oriented interdisciplinary modules are proving to be very promising in countries in which cutting off a year out of high-school curricula be connected with

prolonging of one initial year B.A. curricula, for in Italy the attrition rate is taking a heavy toll on academic life.

2. PROBLEMS

The 2009 World Philosophy was divided into seventeen panels, which considered three sets of problems. The first set was related to identity issues: (1) Identity, Philosophy and the European Tradition; (2) Intercultural Philosophy and Multiperspectivity; (3) Philosophy with Younger Pupils in Lower Professional and Technical. The second set concerned educational segments: (4) Philosophy in Continuing Education; (5) Philosophy and Ethics with Reference to Religion Teaching; (6) Inter-or Transcultural Philosophy; Philosophy and media; (7) The Values of Students; (8) Effectiveness in Society. And the third group looked into philosophical issues such as: (9) Liberating From the Stereotypes Concerning the History of Philosophy; (10) Dialogue of Rationalities; (11) Cultural Self-Consciousness in the Era of Globalization; (12) Philosophical Images of Human Being; (13) XXI century's Technological Challenges; (14) Values and the Dialogue of Cultures; (15) Philosophy for Children; (16) National Self-Consciousness Transformations at the Post-Soviet Area; (17) Teaching Philosophy in Multicultural Context.

2.1 Cultural Self-Consciousness in the Era of Globalization

Today, we are looking into appropriating philosophy's specific ways of thought, which in their present form are distinctive of our cultural identity. Especially European is the capability of confronting one's own tradition with the tradition of one's neighbor, within the cultural melting pot already spoken about by Plato in the *Timaeus* (23c) with regard to the translation of the art of writing from Egypt to Greece. The questions I am about to raise concerns, then, the polycentric identity of Europe's as well as that of many other cultures. The origin of Europe's intellectual identity lies in the *translatio studiorum*, the transmission of a common heritage of learning from Antiquity to Modernity that derives from classical Greek, Classical and Medieval Latin, and Arab and defines itself alongside with the individual *linguae vulgares* by setting up disciplinary lexica for all languages of Europe. Linguistic signs are the main vector for exchanging ideas and lexica. With their transformation and hybridizations, they are the key for shaping cultures within the dynamism of their historical actuality. Languages are fundamental for Europeans wanting to work together, says Multilingualism Commissioner Leonard Orban. Opting for multilingualism is an excellent way to bring European citizens closer to each other.

Besides, it is an action that makes an effective contribution to the competitiveness of the European economy. In fact, languages are not something we can put on and off, they are our own skin, an organ we need for surviving. Languages are the very heart of the unity in diversity of the EU and are all equally necessary for pointing out the essence of Europe's intellectual identity as opposed to intellectual identities that have been shaped by the monolingual option, as it is case, e.g., with the US, China, and India.

2.2 Cultural Identity

The objective is to provide access to the texts that have built the cultural consciousness of the European people by developing digital resources for philosophy and the human sciences in the principal European languages (Latin and Ancient Greek included). Cultural history. Cultural identity and diversity are political issues. The point is multiculturalism and interculturalism are not about giving answers, they are about questions to be raised. Internet access makes new definitions of national identity, European identity, terrestrial identity possible. Globally interconnected. It is Leibniz again and his dream of a universal library—dans le cybionte.

2.3 Neohumanism Lost

The process initiated by the Bologna Conference in 1999 towards an economically, environmentally, and culturally sustainable development has led to the constitution of the European Research Area (ERA) and the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), in which research and education are in the process of being streamlined in all participating countries. One of its first consequences was a long wished for increase in the number of graduates all over Europe. Given that the main difficulty seems to lie in disseminating an idea of science that were at the crossroad between basic and applied research, very much in the spirit of the Bologna declaration, an answer to this difficulty is the *studium generale*, which is a set of interdisciplinary modules aimed at presenting to students of all disciplines the nucleus of European science and philosophy (from Aristotle's *Analytica* to Euclid's *Stoicheia*, from Plato's *Politeia* to Augustine's *Confessiones*). At a number of European universities, the *studium generale* is currently a program aimed at transmitting Humanities methodologies and texts. It is both philosophy and reflection on culture, it is cultural theory, cultural management, and artistic practice. The main goal of the *studium generale* is orienting students in the years that precede their final choice of a profession. For this reason, no degree is in *studium generale*. It is instead an auxiliary program offered to all students. The stress is on the autonomous and reflective ability of connecting among diverse disciplines, on thinking and acting beyond one's own field, on

producing one's own strategy as well as on mastering communication techniques. In other words, the stress is on developing the constitution of one's own personality, ripeness of judgment, sharpness of perception, and taste for beauty. At the basis lies the tradition of neohumanism, which half a century ago had already inspired Robert Maynard Hutchins to ask for the introduction of the renowned Humanities 1 and Humanities 2 modules of the "Great Books Curriculum" and for its textual basis in the fifty-four volumes of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* series, *The Great Books of the Western World*, from Homer to Sigmund Freud. If one admits the comparison, the project outlined below fulfils half a century later the same function fulfilled by the *Britannica* Great Books with the difference, however, of its not being on paper, of its being open access, of its being multilingual. Besides, teaching philosophy is neither about offering nor requiring a simple canon of books. It is about – as Hans Blumenberg has suggested – the appropriation of specific *Denkformen*: first and foremost the ability of coming to terms with old and new forms of *translatio studiorum*, resulting in a cultural fusion of one's traditions with the traditions of one's neighbors.

3. A PERSPECTIVE

In Rome, the Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee-CNR (ILIESI) investigates Europe's "intellectual identity" according to the etymological sense of the German verb *verstehen*, which is based on the Greek *epistēme*: to stand over in order to have a more comprehensive vision. Monitoring users' searches for the development of the availability of digital resources will produce a deepening engagement on the basis of automated systems. The ILIESI proposes a new approach towards an intercultural history of philosophy that considers the development of disciplinary lexica due to the necessity of maintaining a cultural tradition's continuity in front of the need of transcribing it into new contexts. When Boethius, e.g., set himself to translate Aristotle into Latin in the sixth century, he was motivated to do so in order, first, to keep alive the Latin classical tradition and, second, to modernize it by being transcribed into the new contexts opened up by the paradigmatic acceptance of Aristotelianism; when Kant chose to re-propose Greek terms such as *phaenomenon* and *noumenon* he did it for he wished, first, to keep up the tradition of writing on Philosophy in German, a tradition that had its classical references in Master Eckhart and Martin Luther, and second, to revitalize it by transcribing it into the new context of the Copernican Revolution.

Riccardo Pozzo

Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia
delle Idee-CNR (www.iliesi.cnr.it)

Gabriele Münnix

Multiperspectivity and Intercultural Philosophy in a Globalized World

1. Plural (global or European) identity – a contradictio in adjecto?
2. Universalization or particularization – the “problem of the one and the many”
3. Approaches and concepts of (national, cultural, ethnical) identity
4. Epistemological progress: Multiperspectivity -without relativism-
5. Understanding otherness: “intercomprehension”
6. Didactica interculturalis philosophiae: Intercultural Philosophy and its didactics – or: intercultural didactics of philosophy?

1. Plural identity – a contradictio in adjecto?

In 1751 David Hume said (in his ‘Principles of Morals’):

“ suppose that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger in proportion to the largeness of men`s views and the force of their mutual connexions. History, experience and reason suffciently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue.” (Hume 1966, 25)

Hume spoke about the possibility that trade and economic connections between countries can enhance distant people’s involvement with one another. As people come in closer touch with each other, they can begin to take an interest in far away persons whose existence may have been only dimly perceived earlier.

Widespread interest in global inequalities and asymmetries, of which antiglobalist protests are a part, can be seen as sort of an embodiment of what David Hume was talking about in his claim that closer economic relations would bring distant people within the reach of “the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice”. According to Amartya Sen, the voices of global protest which focus on the unequal and unjust deals that the underdogs of the world get, are but part of a newly developing ethics of globalization in the contemporary world: “The motivating ideas suggest the need for seeking a fairer deal for the deprived and the miserable, and for a more just distribution of opportunities in a suitably modified global order...” And this “can have a very

substantial role in taking us away from the confrontation of sharply divisive identities.” (Sen 2007, 148)

The world has changed a lot since 1751. Foreign cultures are no longer far away, they live here with us, ‘distinct societies’ have become anachronistic, and distances have shrunk.

In fact one can describe our present age of globalization as one of compression: “The global field as a whole is a sociocultural system which has resulted from the compression of civilizational cultures, national societies, intra- and cross-national movements and organizations, sub-societies and ethnic groups, individuals and so on. As the general process of globalization proceeds there is a concomitant constraint upon such entities to ‘identify’ themselves in relation to the global-human circumstance and environment (Robertson 1992, ch 4) – even before expeditions in space led us to feel ourselves as “inhabitants of this one earth”.

“Across the universe” we find global popular culture: Its icons can be found throughout the world. “Mel Gibson and Madonna are as well known in Brazil as in Belgium; Guns ‘n’ Roses or Jurassic Parc draw huge audiences in Tokyo and in Toronto... Global culture transcends or erodes national cultures... Popular culture and its market has been universalized – the same video clips, films or television programmes are consumed in London, New York and Paris, and very often they are marketed by the same group of transnational corporations. This leads to the view that politics are irrelevant.” But according to Street this does not automatically mean to accept a concomitant process of cultural unification and standardization, as one could presume. (Street in Scott 1997, 75)

Can there be plural identity? According to Wolfgang Welsch, a German postmodernist, we have to think personal identity as a bundle of different roles which are part of our identities. What is necessary is a ‘competence of transition’, corresponding to his model of “transversal reason”, in which we have to imagine different types of discourse with overlapping common areas, which allow these transitions (Welsch 1995). According to Nietzsche we have to be “manifold”, have to go through many perspectives and experience many views, before we are able to see the whole from an uplifted perspective. According to Amartya Sen we have lots of identities: “The same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizen, of Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a vegetarian, a woman, a long-distance runner, a historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist, a feminist, a heterosexual, a defender of gay and lesbian rights, a theatre lover, an environmental activist, a tennis fan, a jazz musician,

and someone who is deeply committed to the view that there are intelligent beings in outer space with whom it is extremely urgent to talk, (preferably in English).... In our normal lives we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups – and we belong to all of them.” But it is dangerous - as it is done very frequently - “to see the world as a federation of religions or of civilizations, thereby ignoring all the other ways in which people see themselves. Underlying this line of thinking is the odd presumption that the people of the world can be uniquely categorized according to some singular and overarching system of partitioning. Civilizational or religious partitioning of the world population yields a “solitarist” approach to human identity which sees human beings as members of exactly one group (in this case defined by civilization or religion, in contrast with earlier reliances on nationalities and classes.) Sen thinks that solitarist approaches to identity can be a good way of misunderstanding nearly everyone in the world, especially if this sort of identity cannot be chosen as main and most important part of one’s personality, but is attached and chosen by others, and this can mean violence. (Sen 2007, xii)

What now could be European identity? Could we probably mix plural qualities, combine our best traits into a union of different cultures? “Discover the Italian in you” was a recommendation in a German television spot, showing a man who was happily dancing in front of a sea sunset with a bottle of Chianti in his hand. Though I like the thought that certain properties and qualities of other cultures can enrich us and can become our own ways of life, these are but grossely superficial cliches which are not helpful at all. What is essential to European identity?

“There are certainly significant degrees of variation in the manifold proposals put forward to specify the core components of a common European culture, but the Judeo-Christian tradition, Hellenism and the Enlightenment are still the most frequently named candidates when it comes to defining the cultural roots of European identity. However, those who delve into the past in search of the origins of European culture can hardly avoid encountering a general dilemma: by trying to find substance, they essentialize particular cultural features and discard alternative identity patterns. Thus to identify the Judeo-Christian legacy implies neglecting the contributions to European history (and science) made by Islam, not only in the Middle Ages; to underline the role of Hellenism (which was not only Greek, but also Asian) ignores the role of the so-called “barbarians”, and finally to concentrate on the enlightenment may involve the risk of downplaying the significance of romanticism in the formation of modern European consciousness and the development of national feelings. In spite of its wide historical scope, the cultural triad in question stands for deliberate choices, thereby excluding other possible options for

collective identification from the European project." Kraus suggests not to define cultural identity by a substantial set of values which appear to be inscribed in a given historical process (and which are dependent on cultural ethno-centric perspectives. He rather prefers to concentrating "on such denominators of group membership as collective memories, codified everyday knowledge, ethnicity, language or religion, which may recall the Wittgensteinian dictum of "forms of life" in a very pragmatic sense. (Kraus 2008, 39)

But these forms of life do not only unite us, but are so diversely different (not only after migration has swept over Europe) that there are problems and conflicts ahead: Salman Rushdies 'Satanic Verses' in Britain, the Muslim slaying of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the Danish cartoons of Muhammad, the wearing of headscarves at state schools in France (where there is, different from Germany, a tradition of church-state separation) (Brahm Levey, 2009,3) - these facts show that there is a lot of work to be done in understanding, tolerating and living plural identities. There are limits to tolerance, and granting freedom for literally everything cannot be the way to ensure the development of European values in a globalized world.

2. Universalization and/or particularization: the "problem of the one and the many"

"Individuality outruns all classification, yet we insist on classifying everyone we meet under some general head." (James 1919, Lect 1, 1) Moreover in reducing complexity life can be handled much better. But there are strong trends to uniformity at least in so-called "civilized regions" (whatever this may be): Not only that we can observe strongly unifying aspects in our technical world all around the globe: TV-screens, mobile phones, laptops, computer games, films and DVDs, planes, ships and cars, bridges and motorways are to be found in nearly all parts of the world. But also professions and everyday life occupations resemble one another more and more: bankers, doctors, cooks, hotel servants, taxi drivers, pilots, teachers do much the same all around the globe. (see Welsch 1992) (This might be the reason why Waldenfels distinguishes social from cultural otherness (Waldenfels 1998): in spite of cultural otherness we may be familiar in regard to our social lives.

In his famous "Pluralistic Universe" William James analyzes that "rationalism means explaining parts by wholes, and thus preserves affinities with monism, since wholeness goes with union, while empiricism inclines to pluralistic views" and means the habit of

explaining wholes by parts. (James, 1977, 1, 3) "No philosophy can ever be anything but a summary sketch, a picture of the world in abridgement, a foreshortened bird's eye view of the perspective of events. And the first thing to notice is this, that the only material we have at our disposal to make a picture of the whole world" (if we won't rely on media) "is supplied by the various portions of that world of which we have already had experience.") (ibid) In an earlier book (*Some problems of Philosophy*, 1919, 133f) he discusses "the one and the many – values and defects" in pointing out that the attribute "one" seems to confer a value for many persons, an ineffable illustriousness and dignity upon the world, by which the conception of it as an irreducible 'many' is believed to clash.... The notion that this latter pluralistic arrangement may obtain is deemed 'irrational', and of course it does make the whole world partly alogical or non-rational from a purely intellectual point of view.

Monism thus holds the oneness to be the more vital and essential element. The entire cosmos then must be a consolidated unit, within which each member is determined by the whole to be just what he or she is. But it contradicts to the character of reality as perceptually experienced, as James argues ("There are novelties, struggles, losses, gains", but "monism usually treats the sense-world as a mirage or illusion" (ibid., 139) (which clearly refers to idealistic monism). And it is fatalistic: there is little place for individual freedom. "Pluralism, on the other hand, taking perceptual experience at its face-value, is free from all these difficulties. It protests against working out ideas in a vacuum made of conceptual abstractions" (James 1967, 140), which may have their epistemological value to rational monists. "But pluralism, accepting a universe unfinished, with doors and windows open to possibilities uncontrollable in advance, gives us less religious certainty than monism. It is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but melioristic rather." It allows particularity not as a moment or part of the whole, but as a value in itself. In his pragmatistic view James describes his method as "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories', supposed necessities, and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." (James 1967, 47)

Whole and complete "block universes" in James' criticism are pseudo-rational because of the supposed absolute point of view, and he observes a "curious tendency to fly to violent conceptual extremes" (James 1977, FN 9, "Monistic Idealism") But "pragmatism, devoted though she be to facts... has no objection – as ordinary empiricism has – to the realizing of abstractions, so long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they actually carry you somewhere. Interested in no conclusions but those which our minds and our experience work out together, she has no apriori prejudices" (James 1967, 57) for instance against matters who do not fit to the system. In fact "Philosophy

has often been defined as the quest or the vision of the world's unity, and indeed it has manifested above all things its interest in unity. But unity doesn't blind empiricists to everything else, doesn't quench their curiosity for special facts, whereas there is a kind of rationalist who is sure to interpret abstract unity mystically and to forget everything else, to treat it as a principle, to admire and worship it, and thereupon comes to a full stop intellectually." (James 1967, 90ff)

"The world is One! – the formula may become a sort of number worship.... Granting the oneness to exist, what facts will be different in consequence? What will the unity be known as? The world is One. Yes, but *how* one?" James concludes in maintaining that "the great point is to notice that the oneness and the manyness are absolutely co-ordinate here. Neither is primordial or more essential or excellent than the other." (James 1977, 95)

In fact this is exactly what modern sociological analysis has brought about:

In investigating globalization Robertson stresses that "globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole." (he refers to McLuhan's 'global village' and the shared simultaneity of media experience (particularly televisual) in our time. But there has been resistance to "world systems" and to cosmopolitanism quite frequently, and so we can observe processes of deglobalization and reglobalization as well. In fact one can also interpret from this point of view European unification as a reaction towards globalization processes, including the re-invention of old traditions (as Venetian carnival). "Questions of the degree to which globalization encourages or involves universalization, as opposed to particularization, are crucial, as well as complex". (Robertson 1992, 12)

According to Robertson the 19th-century sociologists such as Comte, Saint-Simon and Marx were faced with the problem of the simultaneity of 'nationalism' and 'globalization'. He thinks in terms of four major aspects: national societies, individuals ("selves"), international relations and humankind (see Figure 1, Robertson 1992, 27). In his view we have to accept "the relative autonomy of each of the four main components and that ... each of the four is in one way or the other constrained by the other three". (Robertson 1992, 28). So he speaks of a "cultural turn"and confirms a reawakening sociological interest in the immense significance of culture and cultural change.

Critical theory as well as postmodern theory deal with culture, in different ways. Cultural anthropologists stress cultural diversity, and relativism is being discussed as a consequence of acknowledging particularity. The "gobal-local-nexus" is nothing new (Polybios in his "Universal History" thematized it in the second century BC), but we have to consider that a single world may contain many particular worlds. So a single

"international society" provokes national , cultural and religious "backlashes". As the number of global institutions and movements greatly increases, societies increasingly face problems of multiculturalism and polyethnicity. While there are strong trends of "Westernization", Islam can be seen as a deglobalizing and at the same time reglobalizing movement. (Robertson 1992 ,59) So cultural pluralism is in itself a constitutive feature of the contemporary globalization debate.

"The nationalisms of the modern world are ... the ambiguous expression of the demand both for ...assimilation into the universal ... and *simultaneously* for ... adhering to the particular, the re-invention of differences. Indeed, it is universalism through particularism, and particularism through universalism." (Wallerstein, 1984, 166f) If we particularize too much (for instance in the sense of Amartya Sen) we may lose sight of typical features and tendencies of cultures and subcultures that do have strongly unifying effects. Nostalgic movements to former identities, to one's supposed roots, combine well with modern issues of universal representation. Anti-totalistic views combine well with global perspectives. So Robertson witnesses -in the late twentieth century- a massive twofold process of "interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism". We can now speak of "universalized particularism" and of "particularized universalism". (Robertson 1992, 103): "The idea of nationalism develops only in tandem with internationalism: Each nation has its peculiar contribution to make to the whole, the family of nations" (ibid.) The globewide encouragement of individualism in association with increasing polyethnicity and multiculturalism promotes nostalgic movements in search for identity, specific particularity and self-assurance. Fears of losing one's autonomy and even identity produce a new cultural consciousness, which goes together with a claim of being a member in the world community. Globalizing and localizing tendencies go together and this dialectic process can be well described as "glocalization". (Scott 1997, 7) Fragmentation and globalization are complementary, and this is a clear distinction between modernization and globalization: No longer is it claimed that the world is converging upon one consensus. Nor is it argued that we are moving from particularism to universalism, as it is done in modernization theories. Friedman claims that "ethnic and cultural fragmentation are not two arguments, two opposing views of what is happening in the world today, but two constitutive trends of global reality." (Friedman 1990, 311) And this bears some consequences for approaches to identity concepts.

3. Approaches and concepts of (national, cultural, ethnical, religious) identity

Classical approaches to the notion of identity as well of culture are very often essentialistic: typical traits or characteristics are isolated from experience and are generalized: some sort of mental substance then is defining what we mean in difference to other identities or cultures.

This may be dangerous especially if we compare national or religious identities to others: Protestants are more educated than Catholics, the French are more elegant and refined as the British, Russians are more brutal than the peace-loving Scandinavians, Muslims are more traditional than Christians. This sort of superficial generalization is likely to produce prejudices and is apparently the worst method of defining identities.

Following Descartes' "cogito" Kant chose a more formal way based on subjective thinking "that must accompany all my acts", a mental substance which is not specified individually.

John Locke criticized the notion of spiritual substance ("soul") and reduced it to pragmatic experience: personal identity means consciousness, namely the fact that at one moment in life we remember other moments and feel them all as parts of one and the same personal history and experience. "Our personal identity then consists, for Locke, solely in pragmatically definable particulars. Whether, apart from these verifiable facts, it also inheres in a spiritual principle, is a merely curious speculation. Locke ... passively tolerated the belief in a substantial soul behind our consciousness." (James 1967, 68f) But what, if we lose our memories? Do we then lose our personal identities as well? This hints at the fact that there has to be an additional, outer and more objective perspective ensuring the continuity of our being an individual person not only with a personal history, but also with personal relations as well.

Of course one could define identity by material substances as well: we all have human DNA, and genome analysis can figure out not only personal profiles, but even ethnical affiliations. And our cultural identity could be described by certain languages, books, theatres, inventions, traditions, monuments, museums, and so on, which all determine our thought in one particular way that makes us different from or similar to others.

In fact the Wittgensteinian approach with certain "forms of life" goes in this direction. It is neither essentialistic, nor nominalistic, but relationistic rather and can identify similar cultures by "family resemblances", an expression which could be found in Hume before.

Essentialist definitions suggest that each ethnic or cultural group has an absolute and fixed set of historical characteristics of identity shared by all its members. Furthermore each cultural identity has one important and essential defining characteristic, said to be

its essence. Non-essentialist definitions focus on the similar characteristics and the differences within an ethnic/cultural group and between the group and others. The fact that identities or defining "forms of life" can change in time is stressed, which an idealistic model would not be able of.

The modern approach is that cultures as well as identities are processes. Cassirer has pointed out that we all, by creating and using symbols, develop culture in many ways: by language, pictures, myths (which contain mental pictures) and scientific research we exert a great forming power to build and shape worlds according to our needs. We are all equal in doing this, though we differ from culture to culture in *how* we do this: So the universality of the "animal symbolicum" *and* the particularity of different realizations of symbolic creations are explained by the same theory of culture.

And we construct identities, which is especially true for people who grow up between different cultures, which in our globalized world is no longer the exception, but happens very often. A very complex model of developing personal identities is George Herbert Mead's symbolic interactionism: It involves a shift from a very subjective point of view to a more objective one: A dialectical process between selves and society in the way of communicative interchange produces objective – not only subjective – meaning which is necessary to the processes of understanding and being understood. "Meaning arises in experience through the individual stimulating himself to take the attitude of the other in his reaction towards the object. Meaning is that which can be indicated to others while it is by the same process indicated to the indicating individual. In so far as the individual indicates it to himself in the role of the other, he is occupying his perspective." And as it is identical, it must be able to exist in different perspectives, it must be meaningful and objectively important, and "this universe of discourse is constituted by a group of individuals carrying on and participating in a common social process of experience and behaviour, within which these gestures or symbols have the same or common meanings for all members of the group" (Mead 1974, 89).

"The very universality and impersonality of thought and reason is - from the behaviouristic point of view - the result of the given individual's taking the attitudes of others toward himself", and this leads to a single attitude or standpoint which may be called that of the "generalized other". And this produces self-awareness: "The organization of the self is simply the organization, by the individual organism, of the set of attitudes toward its social environment – and toward itself from the standpoint of that environment." (Mead 1974,90f)

How in detail does a self arise? The conversation by gestures and symbols is action with reference to the conduct of others. Language enables us to arouse responses in ourselves. (Actually our thinking always takes place by means of some sort of symbols which are universal in their character: "What is essential to communication is that the symbol should arouse in one's self what it arouses in the other individual. It must have this sort of universality to any person who finds himself in the same situation." (Mead 1974, 149) We develop common attitudes as self-aware persons, which "makes us ... members of society and gives us selves. Selves can only exist in definite relationships to other selves. No hard and fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also." Mead (as James did before) distinguishes the two perspectives which constitute a self: The first person-perspective, the "I" refers to subjective reflective intelligence, the "me" is seen from the perspective of the "generalized other": "each individual has to take also the attitude of the community, the generalized attitude" (Mead 164 ff) The taking or feeling the attitude of the other towards yourself is what constitutes self-awareness. (Until the rise of his self-awareness in the process of social experience, the individual experiences his body – its feelings and sensations – merely as an immediate part of his or her environment, not as his own, not in terms of self-consciousness. This is a dialectic model which strongly reminds of Hegel, though it is not idealistic, but society-based. The "I" is aware of the social "me", but it does not as a whole become an object to itself. And here time comes in: The "I" of this moment is present in the "me" of the next moment. The "I" represents memories of past actions towards the "generalized other", the "me" is responsible for development, as it provokes responses of the "I". Both are phases of the self, combining self-assertion and commitment to society. The "other" and the "I" as moments of our self express the twofold recognition of others and of oneself in the others. (Mead 1974, 193f). But something new emerges, as when we combine the elements H and O and get water. It is through his relationship to others in that community (and this could on a larger scale also be the world community), that he has a being as a citizen. But there is plurality, no necessary development to higher steps of objective mind: "The fact that every individual self has its own peculiar individuality, its own unique pattern and thus reflects this pattern as a whole from its own particular and unique standpoint... (just as every monad in the Leibniz universe mirrors that universe from a different point of view, and thus mirrors a different aspect or perspective of that universe). But this does not necessarily produce "wide individual differences and variations among them." (Mead 1974, 201)

But we want to recognize ourselves in our differences from other persons, and this is why – again on a larger scale – we can become aware of our own cultural identity in intercultural encounters with members of diverse cultures (Ozolina in Furch 2003, 195 quoting Gudykunst 1994, 48) (and earlier of course Cassirer). But there is also a critical remark: in Mead’s own words: “ It seems to be perfectly legitimate, to assert the superiority of the nation to which one belongs over other nations, to brand the conduct of other nationalities in black colours in order that we may bring out values in the conduct of those that make up our own nation.... We all believe that the group we are in is superior to other groups. “In fact according to Richard Rorty we cannot avoid ethnocentrism. (Rorty 1993, 21). Is contextualism or relativism a necessary consequence if we regard and acknowledge various and different perspectives?

4. Epistemological Progress: Multiperspectivity without Relativism

“The house seen from nowhere actually cannot be seen at all. We always see and perceive from somewhere.” Thus, in his phenomenology of perception Merleau-Ponty (1966, 91) points out the important role of the individual self and his or her bodily existence for the process of perception from individual perspectives, which is fundamental to every cognition. In his book “The view from nowhere” Thomas Nagel however tries to develop an epistemological model in which, despite of our extreme subjective perspectives with which we begin, we should try to make our perspectives more and more less subjective, and even try to reach beyond human perspectives, which Nagel calls “ultraobjectivity”. Of course this is meant as a boundary process towards some sort of regulative idea.

Can we achieve this? Perspectivism in Europe begins with Renaissance philosophy and Nicholas of Cusa. Later on Leibniz ensured (by “preestablished harmony”) that the different perspectives should not be too different. And of course we cannot assume a sort of harmony between the many and - in our days better known - grossly diverging cultures of our present universe. Nietzsche renounced this presupposition, thus developing a different sort of perspectivism where some perspectives had to be more powerful and superior than others. In losing the one, the absolute perspective (“we - the many perspectives shall become Gods.” - see Nietzsche 1964) man is to gain wider horizons in order to enjoy his superiority. (There are better motives in my view to reach this over-viewing perspective.)

Merleau-Ponty with his perspectivism wanted to find a position between idealistic intellectualism and empiricism, criticizing rationalistic concepts of cognition that completely forgot about bodily perceptions which are bound to concrete perspectives. In Merleau-Ponty now we find a good explanation of what is called the metaphor of the

"blind spot", (Merleau-Ponty 1966, 117) which has become quite important to intercultural epistemology: it is the spot in the back of our eye, which enables us to see things, as there is the entry of the visual nerve). We do not realize at all that we do not see from this very place, but nevertheless it is crucial, a necessary condition, to our ability of seeing anything. In Kant's words it may even be classified as transcendental. The point from which we see remains hidden to our consciousness. This can of course be generalized:

Similar to Whorf's "background phenomenon" premises that are too common to us will not get into sight (as it is the case with the grammar of our mothertongues which we normally think to be universal categories of thought.) (Whorf 1956, 138) But in changing perspectives, for instance in viewing ourselves from the standpoint of the "generalized other", we can often enlighten these blind spots and find out, what is specific to our own ways of viewing the world, even though we may not have been conscious of it. Even better is, instead of abstract opposite views, a concrete person from a different culture with whom we can exchange our views about the world, and here "standpoint" is not only meant in a literal way, but also metaphorically. The "Western" development to a highly elaborated individuality for instance cannot be assumed or presupposed likewise in other parts of the world, where there are more communitarian concepts of the role of selves in communities, for instance in Asia and Africa.


This is no reason to feel superior or more civilized or to look in contempt on more "primitive" societies. We have to take into account not only different histories, but also different ways of seeing the world, there are even different ways of perception, and we can experience other ways of seeing the world. Nagel's double aspect theory explaining the development of the self distinguishes between a first and a third person's perspective and bears strong similarities to Mead's approach. The development goes in stages, each of which gives a more objective picture than the one before, as there is a moment of self-transcendence towards more objectivity: "If we are parts of the world as it is in itself then we ought to be able to include ourselves - our minds as well as our bodies - in a conception that is not tied exclusively to our own point of view. We ought in other words to be able to think of ourselves from outside -, but in mental, not in physical terms. Such a result would qualify as an objective concept of mind (Nagel 1986, 17). Though there are some things which can only be understood from the inside, and access to them will depend on how far our subjective imagination can travel, there is the aim of a centerless view: "Though the subjective features of our own minds are at the center of *our* worlds" this is only one manifestation of the mental in the world that is not given especially to the human point of view. (Nagel 1986, 18) "The beginning of an

objective concept of mind is the ability to view one's own experiences from outside, as events in the world. If this is possible then others can also conceive of those events and one can conceive of the experience of others, also from outside" (Nagel 1986, 20), and this is no mere exchange of subjective views, but refers to a common reality.



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These other perspectives can enrich our own view of the world: As our own perspectives are necessarily limited and focused on different phenomena, it may be helpful to combine different perspectives in regard to a special problem or subject. This is what happens in interdisciplinary cooperations, why couldn't it be done more in intercultural experience? Cognition as "joint venture", as I may call it, can help us to enlighten "dead angles", regions which lie outside the focus of our interests, but which may as well be important to solve a problem or get a more complete and complex view of some subjects.



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There is epistemological progress in more centerless views of the world, in which different persons can converge. Objectivity places us both inside and outside the world, and offers us possibilities of self-transcendence (Nagel 1986, 66) This illustrates clearly "the human capacity to escape the limits of the original human situation, not merely by travelling around and seeing the world from different perspectives, but by ascending to new levels from which we can understand and criticize the general forms of previous perspectives. The step to a new perspective is the product of epistemological insight in each case." (Nagel 1986, 77)

And if we thus are able to widen our horizons, we can take more overviewing perspectives and gain more knowledge about cultures, which will help Amartya Sen's quest against simple partitions and simplified classifications. By thus increasing our grasp of reality we arrive at "an indefinite increase on objectivity of standpoint" (Nagel, *ibid.*), and this surely is an epistemological progress.



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Perspectivism has often been under suspicion to be inevitably relativistic. But as we see, this is not necessarily the case. What has to be discussed in intercultural philosophy however – beside other important topics - are issues of truth and tolerance and ways of thinking. (see Münnix 2003)

5. Understanding Otherness: "Intercomprehension"

Are we able to understand differences not only about the identity of humans but also about the cosmos they live in? Misunderstandings are normal, but may be dangerous. Taking different perspectives from one's own habits of seeing the world may not be as easy as described above.

Thomas Nagel's famous essay on what it may be like to be a bat illustrates that even if we can describe every brain process of bats scientifically, we will never know what it is like to *be* a bat from the inside. The inner subjective side of consciousness will never be reached from outside, other minds are not fully accessible. There are similarities, but also enough differences which will remain foreign. And we often tend to project our own categories and interpretation schemes into the foreign consciousness, which may even cause greater misunderstandings.

Let me give three examples:

1. A historical anecdote, the so-called "Valladolid controversy" (Latour, in Robertson-von Trotha, 2007, 44f) shows clearly that it is naive and ethnocentric to assume that enemies or people from different cultures agree in baseline principles: The Spanish conquistadores held to decide whether or not Indians had souls susceptible of being saved (they might have been something like wild animals). (In his essay about inhabitants of the New World, who were even supposed to be cannibals, Montaigne ironically describes uncivilized people as those who do not wear breeches at all!).

On the other side Indians were engaged in a no less important debate; namely whether or not Spaniards had bodies or were some sort of spiritual beings - like Gods. "It was not to decide whether Spaniards had souls, so much was obvious. In their cosmos all entities share the same fundamental organisation: A licuri palm, a peccary, a piranha, the macaw: Each has a soul, a language, and a family life modelled on the pattern of

human (Indian) village. Entities all have souls and their souls are all the same. What makes them differ is that their bodies differ, and it is bodies that give souls their contradictory perspectives. Entities all have the same culture, but do not perceive, do not live in the same nature. For the controversialists at Valladolid the opposite was the case, but they remained blissfully unaware that there was an opposite side...Each side conducted an experiment based on its own premises and procedures: on the one side to determine whether Indians have souls, and on the other side to determine whether Europeans had bodies. The Amerindians' experiment was as scientific as the Europeans': Conquistador prisoners were taken as guinea pigs and immersed in water to see, first if they drowned and second if their flesh would eventually rot. This experiment was as crucial to the Amerindians as was the Valladolid dispute to the Iberians. If the conquerors drowned and rotted, then the question was settled: they had bodies. But if they did not drown or rot, then the conquerors had to be purely spiritual entities, perhaps similar to shamans." (Latour 2007,44) Levi-Strauss summarizes: "The whites were invoking the social sciences while the Indians had more confidence in the natural ones." (Lévi-Strauss 1973, 55, 82f)

2. The Danish cartoons of Muhammad have been very superficially defended in so-called "Western" argument as grant of freedom of the press and artistic creativity. One can even quote human rights. But the Kairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam has an article, where freedom of the press is granted, with an appendix: "if the honour of God is not offended."

From this point of view Western autonomy can be valued as decadent, whereas the morally mature Muslim reaches the highest degree of morality in submitting himself under the will of God. Above the level of autonomy there is a level of theonomy. And in aniconic cultures and sub-cultures pictures are banned on the whole, as a sign of respect towards the sacred to which every picture is insufficient and much too small: The infinite cannot be adequately portrayed, and it is a sign of respect not to do so. (You won't find any pictures, only symbols and ornaments in synagogues and mosques. The film "Muhammad" never shows Muhammad himself, but only events from his point of view, we see through His eyes). Especially caricatures can be seen as a product of enlightenment; they simplify, they ironically show misuse and misgovernment, they criticize by wilful exaggeration, they point out the ridiculous, sometimes in a cynical sort of way, and they do it on purpose.

This sort of critical, sometimes willfully offending pictorial humour, often against authorities, for instance when politicians are concerned, is not always understood by cultures who have not gone through the period of enlightenment and have different concepts of authority, where church and state have not been divided, but are in a close connection with each other. Offending the sacred by ridicule does offend religious feelings which in secular societies very few people may think of. Of course there are some pictures of Muhammad (mostly from Turkish and Iranian origin, never from Saudi Arabia), but they always show Muhammad with a veil over his face. The more fundamentalistic countries even extend the banning of pictures to the profane: Monuments in Dschiddah show hands and feet, but never a whole figure, and food packages not only in Arabian countries are oddly pictureless. The veil can be seen as a symbol (Kreutzer in Valentin 2002, 96) that the essential must remain hidden, and pictures of nakedness are shameful, which throws a glimpse not only on the very permissive pictures of nakedness in the "West", but also on the humiliating photos of

naked Abu Graib prisoners. It can be seen clearly that there must be very controversial intracultural discussions on film and television pictures in traditionally aniconic cultures: What are they allowed to show and if so, how are they allowed to do it? (Valentin 2002, 155).

Not only religion seems to play a role: Among Bollywood film producers are many Indian Muslims, and of course we must distinguish Shia, Sunnya, Alevites and others in this question (Sen 2006, 59). If we want to improve our understanding of the cosmos of Muslim thinking, we have to know a lot more about their cultural values. (Whose cosmos, which cosmopolitics? asks Latour, and from this point of view Stephen Toulmins "Cosmopolis" is hopelessly "Western".)

3. There is no grammatical subject in Japanese and Chinese languages, and in Japanese questions have to be answered from the point of view of the asking person, which involves a very early exercise of not only thinking from one's own perspective. This corresponds to an attitude in traditional Japanese subcultures, that each self-assertion is extremely shameful. Modesty, even humbleness against guests have to be demonstrated, for instance when introducing family members. (Takayama 1994, 394f) "Japan" is often called synonymously "land of harmony" by the Japanese, and there are strong communitarian trends in society obliging everybody to be part of the community. (Though Takayama reports that there are arising different "modern" attitudes as well, especially in economy.) But it is clearly understood that cultures with a moral obligation not to assert or articulate one's own selves cannot easily play their part in rational discourse, as Habermas and Apel would imagine normal for each member of the rational community.

From this point of view Apel's idea of a "planetary macroethics" by rational discourse with the purpose of final consent seems somewhat naive, especially if we consider that there are other cultures that may not have the means or do not wish to articulate themselves in the "rational language" of discourse (which is, for instance from the standpoint of Muslim mysticism no way to approach the truth.) Instead, the diagnosis of Lyotard seems to be fitting: The "Western" concept of rational discourse seems to be excluding too many possible participants. (Lyotard 1989,33) and cannot be applied universally.

These examples may show that we are very often inclined to take for granted and even for universal what is normal and common in our own cultures. We apply our own habits and interpretation schemes to other cultures and thereby grossly misunderstand what is important to them. In the view of Lévinas the claim to understand and interpret foreign cultures by means and habits of one's own can even mean violence: Some sort of mental imperialism colonizes the foreign by claiming universal interpretations without real understanding. (Lévinas 1983). For Said this is postcolonialism. (Said 1994) What could be done about this?

The second Kant postulate of how philosophizing should be done is that we are to think ourselves in the place of any other person, at any time (Kant Logik A 84). But as we see, this may be very difficult. Kant may not have been aware of the vast difficulties which different languages and different cultures as well as different ways of life may mean to his project of peace and an international league of nations, where there has to be meaningful and sensible (as well as sensitive) communication. But with our knowledge of today we may take into account these difficulties and try to understand each other in a better way without "postcolonial superstition".

We have strangeness within ourselves, as Waldenfels pointed out (Waldenfels 1990) and this may facilitate our endeavours to understand foreign "otherness", which for Lévinas is the absolute "alterity" we will never be able to grasp. Nevertheless we have to be open for the "call of the other" which is never abstract, but meets us in the way of the concrete other person.

A good approach in my eyes is that of Anne Koch, who according to Quine's thought experiment in "Word and Object" develops a so-called "simulative hermeneutics". In "Understanding Foreignness" she suggests iterative thought experiments where we have to imagine ourselves to be in the foreign person's position. This is done not only rationally, with all our knowledge about foreign worlds and ways of life, but also with considerable empathy.

The more often we do this, with the same person, or with persons from the same culture, the better we will be able to understand reactions and motives which were not within our reach before. This sort of intercultural dialogue is crucial to better insight, it may help to prevent violence, and we will never be able to learn only from books how other people feel and see the world. Separatism is dangerous. And especially as we live in a time where formerly foreign cultures and nations mingle in our everyday life, where we have schools with more than 20 nationalities, this is a big social as well as educational task.

7. Didactica interculturalis philosophiae - "interkulturelle Philosophiedidaktik"

In Latin – and in German this expression can be read in a double way, and of course both ways are necessary and important in a globalizing world: A didactics of intercultural

philosophy (Münnix 2000), which indeed does not only have European roots (Mall 1998). Hellenistic philosophy took place all around the Mediterranean; St. Augustine came from Tunisia, Thales from today's Turkey, Averroes from Arabia, Plotin from Egypt. (see Holenstein 2004) But very old Chinese and Indian thinking traditions too have to be taken into account as well: they have to be compared with occidental thought. But beyond comparatistic philosophy we have to discuss our concepts of truth (a deconstruction of binary logic may well be necessary) and about what the limits of tolerance should be. Intercultural phenomenology and epistemology, different ways of how to think according to different traditions of logic and philosophy of language all have consequences for intercultural hermeneutics. And of course different approaches to intercultural ethics have to be discussed between the cultures, not only academically. And we try to do this with philosophers from many nations in the Society for Intercultural Philosophy.

But the second reading is just as important: an intercultural discourse about the didactics of philosophy - as we do it in the AIPPh - will enable us to discuss various methodological concepts in teaching philosophy from different points of view, influenced by different philosophical traditions and personal preferences. An exchange about our aims and the subjects that we think should be compulsory in teaching philosophy today will help us not only to underline the global importance of our subject, but also to find particular ways in doing so. And this joint venture again is enrichment.

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Social Value Orientations of Russian Youth: The Thesaurus Conception

Abstract

The study on value orientations in Russia has been conducted from the middle of the 1960s when the theoretical works by a psychologist B. G. Anan'ev, sociologists A. G. Zdravomyslov, V. A. Iadov and others appeared, as well as empirical studies. The biggest one was the sociological and social-psychological study on workers' value orientations (including young people), carried out by Leningrad scientists under the direction of V. A. Iadov in the beginning of the 1970s. During the Soviet time the study on youth value orientations to a considerable degree was directed toward the revelation of their accordance with the communist ideal, to the socialist lifestyle. At the period of the Perestroika (1985–1991) the problem field was noticeably extended due to the studies on the informal youth associations (actually it was the way to the switch to study on the youth subcultures). Finally, during the last 18 years value orientations of the Russian youth have been investigated by considerable number of individual scholars and scientific groups. The situation of social order change and "re-comprehension of values" on the national scale has encouraged the scientists to interpret the transformation of value orientations of the Russians. The extensive study on dynamics of the value orientations of the Russians that was conducted under the direction of N. I. Lapin is of a great scientific significance. There have been dozens of empirical studies carried out in Russia for the last 18 years, several hundreds theses defended on the problem of the youth value orientation. Although quite often the scopes of such studies, their methodical correctness and opportunities for the data comparison remain to be a subject of criticism.

We will consider the trends of changes in value orientations of the Russian student youth, which are stated on the empirical level. However, in the beginning we will define what the theoretical meaning of the study on the Russian youth value orientations is. Also we will specify what the essence of the value aspect of the youth studies is.

Keywords:

Value orientations, social values, Russian youth, empirical researches, socialisation, concept of personalities, «student body», globalization

Die Studie über die Wertorientierungen in Russland wurde von der Mitte der 1960er Jahre, wenn die theoretischen Arbeiten durch einen Psychologen BG Ananov erschien Soziologen Zdravomyslov AG, VA Iadov und anderen durchgeführt, als auch empirische Studien. Die größte war der soziologischen und sozialpsychologischen Studie über Arbeiter Wertorientierungen (einschließlich junger Menschen), durchgeführt von Leningrad Wissenschaftler unter der Leitung von VA Iadov zu Beginn der 1970er Jahre. Während der sowjetischen Zeit, die Studie über die Jugend Wertorientierungen zu einem erheblichen Teil war zur Enthüllung ihrer Übereinstimmung mit den kommunistischen Ideal gerichtet, um die sozialistische Lebensweise. In der Zeit der Perestroika das Problem Feld deutlich erweitert wurde aufgrund der Studien über die informelle Jugendverbände (eigentlich war es die Art und Weise der Umstellung auf die Jugend-Subkulturen-Studie). Schließlich haben in den letzten 18 Jahren Wertorientierungen der russischen Jugend wurde durch eine erhebliche Zahl von einzelnen Wissenschaftlern und wissenschaftlichen Gruppen untersucht. Die Situation der sozialen Ordnung zu ändern und erneut Verständnis der Werte auf der nationalen Ebene ermutigt hat, den Wissenschaftlern, die Umwandlung von Wertorientierungen der Russen zu interpretieren. Die umfangreiche Studie über die Dynamik der Wertorientierungen der Russen, die unter der Leitung von NI Lapin ist eine große wissenschaftliche Bedeutung durchgeführt wurde. Es gibt Dutzende von empirischen Studien in Russland in den letzten 18 Jahren verteidigte mehrere hundert Thesen über das Problem der Jugend-Value-Orientierung. Obwohl oft die Bereiche solcher Studien, bleiben ihre methodischen Möglichkeiten für die Richtigkeit und die Daten verglichen, als Gegenstand der Kritik.

Wir betrachten die Trends der Veränderungen in der Wertorientierungen der russischen studentischen Jugend, die auf der empirischen Ebene angegeben sind. Doch zu Beginn werden wir definieren, was die theoretische Bedeutung der Studie über die russische Jugend Wertorientierungen ist. Auch werden wir festlegen, was das Wesen des Wertes Aspekt der Studien über die Jugend ist.

Stichwörter:

Wertorientierungen, soziale Werte, Russisch Jugend, empirische Untersuchungen, die Sozialisierung, Konzept von Persönlichkeiten, Studenten, Globalisierung.

RUSSIAN YOUTH: THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCHES

There are deep-rooted traditions of researches on the youth problems in Russia. By their trends and purposes they partly concur with the traditions of the humanities in Europe and America. In Russia in different times –it was the same way in the West – diverse youth concepts had been conveying and continue to express the society's expectations for new generations. This is in a sense a theoretical mirror of the natural process of generation change. Under modern conditions these concepts can be reduced to three directions: youth – “no man's land”, youth – social danger, youth – hope of society. At the same time youth theories have the mark of the socio-cultural contexts and contexts of the development of the humanities in Russia. In this article these similarities and distinctions will be examined.

The development of youth theories in the world on the whole and in Russia in particular progresses in discrete steps. The three main schools of theoretical understanding of youth¹ were formed in the 1920s – the beginning of the 1930s. Indeed, there were minor deviations: for instance, the book “Adolescence” by an American sociologist G. Stanley Hall was published in 1904, the publications by a German psychologist K. Gross, which contained important states for the formation of youth theories, appeared in 1912, the “Diagnosis of Our Time” by a German sociologist K. Manheim, in which his earlier stated theses were evolved, was issued in 1943, etc.

The first school defines *youth as a bearer of psychophysical features of adolescence*. The researchers investigate not essentially youth, but adolescence as a life period of an individual (G. Stanley Hall, Charlotte Bühler, W. Stern, A. Freud, W. Reiche).

The second school interprets *youth as a cultural group* – through the aggregate of cultural characteristics and functions (E. Spranger, R. Benedict, B. Malinowsky, M. Meed and others).

The third school studies *youth as an object and subject of the process of succession and change of generations* – the social function of youth is in the foreground here (the sociologists of the Marxist school, K. Manheim).

The ascent of the youth sociology in the 1960s – the beginning of the 1970s (also with minor deviations beyond this period) proceeded in the same ways, primarily in the

¹ According to our classification. See: Kovaleva and Lukov, 1999.

second (S. Eisenstadt, F. Tenbruck, T. Roszak and others) and third (H. Schelsky, L. Rosenmayer) directions.

We see the circumstances of the great advance in the theoretical understanding of youth in these two periods, because just at that time youth showed its worth through self-reference in the forms of youth movement especially vividly. The theoretical presuppositions for determination of youth as an object of special research had already been in the 19th century, but nevertheless they were not realized in the youth theories. There are the theoretical possibilities of development of the conceptions on youth in modern sociology, which has changed greatly with the propagation of phenomenological sociology and strengthening of the postmodern tendencies, but these possibilities remain mostly potential. In this fact we find the peculiarities of youth self-realization and its self-reference. Apparently, what is ascribed to the present youth subcultures is not enough for youth self-reference and in these forms what was typical for the mass youth movement of the 1920s and the 1960s is not attained.

The Thesaurus Conception of Youth

The theoretical elaboration of youth problems, as we understand it, must chiefly follow the path of solution of a number of contradictions, which have been formed in the practice of empirical researches. It is also closely connected with the question about the sociological providing of youth policy, social and youth work and other theoretical scope of scientific knowledge about youth. Many attempts of Russian researchers are aimed at the development of a theory of youth, which would be more adequate to practical purposes. One of such theories is based on the thesaurus approach². Within this theory, the youth is interpreted as a social group consisting of:

- (1) People, who assimilate and appropriate a social subjectivity, have the social status of young people and identify themselves as being young;
- (2) Thesauruses, which are prevalent in this social group;
- (3) The symbolical and physical world, which expresses and reflects these thesauruses.

Such components of the concept and such a connection between them, which is understood as reflection of the social reality, change the very view on sociology of youth.

² Lukov, 2003.

The thesaurus concept of youth gives an opportunity to make the ways of development of youth social subjectivity clear and find out its controversial traits both as an "objectivated" activity and in facts of self-consciousness, which perform an important regulative function.

The circumstance that institutionalized world is not much assimilated by a young person demands compensatory actions from himself, i.e. self-independent and predetermined interaction in peer group. Gradually he is familiarizing with area, rules, realities of this world. The mechanisms of this familiarization are construction and projecting of social reality. The constructions and projects of a young man can essentially differ from constructions and projects of a "responsible adult" (parents, teachers, etc.) and besides dynamically change. One of the peculiarities of youth milieu is combination of several thesauruses. It causes event-trigger hyperbolization of one of them, which is considered to be the most suitable in this particular life situation.

The general arrangement of social reality construction includes:

(1) adaptation for conditions of environment (trial and mistakes; recognition of parts of environment and rules; alteration of behaviour according to rules; understanding and legitimation of a part of environment through "our");

(2) completion of building of reality (symbolization through "good" and "evil", construction of symbolic universe; compensation for the inaccessible; activities for protection of "my world", separation of independence zone);

(3) restructuring of environment conditions (ignoring of unimportant; change of proportions and combinations according to thesaurus; action beyond "my world" in compliance with own symbolic universe).

These positions realize themselves as a factual result of vital functions and fulfillment of the project.

Reality construction is obvious in the actions of different youth groups. The aim is not to settle on these well discernible behavioral and symbolic complexes, which are quite often distinguished by an exterior observer with negative evaluative attitude. Activity of youth in social construction of reality constitutes the most important condition of its socialization and in this respect refers not to separate, but all youth communities.

Values: problems of theory

In the conceptual dictionary for the humanities the term "value" was introduced by Rudolph Lotze. In his opinion, value exists only in its significance for a subject, but at the same time it is objective and possesses general significance for individuals. As H. Rickert explained, "Lotze wanted not only 'calculate' the world, but also "understand"

it³. In other words, in philosophy the new category was being linked with the problem of understanding. Lotze noted the ambivalence of value and its subjective and objective nature. In the following interpretations of this category the stress was laid sometimes on the subjectivity of value, sometimes – on its objectivity. The objectivistic interpretation of value was reflected in Gordon Allport's dispositional conception of person who elaborated "the test of values' study" in the 1930s–1960s. In the Russian sociological school the dispositive concept of personalities have been offered by V. A. Iadov and it is still accepted by many other researchers.

The works by O. G. Drobnitskii⁴ have had a considerable impact on modern Russian researchers of values and value orientations. Recently the traces of the approaches that were accepted in their time by the classics of the Sociological school of Chicago⁵ have been noticeable.

During numerous researches on values as a theoretical problem, scholars of different countries, representatives of various scientific schools have expressed many original ideas that allow us to speak of a high level of the elaboration of this matter. The development of the theory of values in modern Russia and in the world as well is expected to continue in the direction of preciseness. The life situation introduces this clarity into it when there are the period of transition and the birth of a new type of civilization – information-oriented. Also they expect the development towards applying of new scientific methods that are being shaped nowadays. In a number of cases it is necessary to follow the path of very general argumentation again in order to define the initial positions of the empirical study.

The specificity of the humanitarian knowledge⁶ presupposes that the used terminology will be submitted by some parameters to other rules in comparison with the terminology of so called exact sciences. At this point there is a possibility of polysemy of terms and, in addition, historical mutability of their content. Therefore, it is important to trace down the history of their origin and understanding in various scientific schools. In essence, in the most cases in the humanitarian knowledge a scientist deals not with terms, but with *concepts*, i.e. with words. In these words aside from a certain content of literal, lexical, figurative, cultural and philosophical meaning there is another image that appears in one's consciousness, and, in its turn, causes an emotional reaction. In contrast to terms, it is very difficult to translate *concepts* from one language into

³ Rikkert 1998, 336.

⁴ Drobnitskii 1967; 1970.

⁵ Thomas and Znaniecki 1918.

⁶ Gumanitarnoe znanie 2006.

another. They bear imprints of language history and cultural history. This leads to difficulties in understanding of humanitarian concepts, which were created in different countries. The same concepts can be absolutely identical in diverse cultures seldom.

Exactly such a concept is the notion "value". In the Russian language it traces back to adjective *tsennyi* ('valuable'), which is formed from the noun *tsena* ('price'). The etymology of this All-Slavonic word can be determined in comparison with Avestian *kaēnā – mest'* ('revenge'), originally it meant *vozmezdie, vozdaianie* ('retribution, requital') (cf. verb *kaiat'sia* – 'to repent'), then *shtraf* ('fine') and finally – 'cost of something'⁷. If we refer to the dictionary of V. I. Dahl that registers usage of the word "tsena" ('price') and its derivatives in the XIX century, it becomes clear that word "tsennost'" ('value') by those times had not yet occupied a noticeable place in the Russian language and is defined "kak svoistvo po prilagatel'nomu" ('as characteristic on adjective')⁸.

In new European languages there are two meanings of the word *value* – as "cost" and as "concernment" – which are usually separated. Thus, in French there is a word *prix* – a price, worth (in meaning of the cost) and there is a word *valeur*, which was fixed in the texts for the first time in 1080⁹, obviously, originated from the Latin word *valeo* – to be healthy, strong, mighty, which is used in the scientific texts in the meaning of "value". In English things looks the same: price and value (valuables). As well as it is in German – *Kostbarkeit* (the subject) and *Wert* (the concept). Though the English *value* and the German *Wert* can correlate with the meaning of 'cost', usually they do so not in a direct, but in a figurative sense. Still, it seems unlikely that the Nietzsche's thesis about "revaluation of values" means the same what such a slogan meant in the Diogenes's times. The same motto pronounced in the Russian language and perceived by the Russian cultural thesaurus (ordered by the totality of social and cultural orientations) means something different. It should be underlined that even the most detailed explanations on their meaning in the first primary sources cannot conceal the fact that "value" is not a term, but a concept. So, on the emotional, almost unconscious level a representative of the Russian culture puts into this word a certain additional meaning, which is determined by the history of its existence in the Russian environment.

Even today as before the concept "value" is closely connected with the notion of price and payment. Its filling with a foreign philosophical content which comes from the West culture occurs without any support from the native scientific tradition of its

⁷ Shanskii, Ivanov and Shanskaia 1961, 366.

⁸ Dal' 1955, 578.

⁹ Robert 1967, 1873.

interpretation. The Russian tradition of explanation of concepts in sociological sense has began to form only recently. This leads to the fact that Russian scientists in the field of the humanities accept those meanings, which at first was offered by different western scientific schools, and apply them for their needs very easily.

However, it is possible to emphasize a certain general meaning, which unites the initial centuries-old understanding of the concept "value" in the Russian culture and to some extent its scientific interpretation, which have appeared during the last decades: "value" is "something" what one cannot buy for money. If it is a thing then one does not grudge giving the required money for it. But if we are talking about people (parents, relatives, friends, beloved, heroes, idols, etc.) or concepts (Motherland, liberty, friendship, love, youth, health, art, science, etc.), in this case they belong to values if they are perceived as priceless, i.e. more significant than any money in the world. Finally, if money is understood as a value then it becomes priceless too and it loses the quantitative side.

These aspects will be taken into account for the generalization of the data we collected during the empirical researches.

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Phänomenologie und Sprache

Resümee: Sprache als Grundsubstanz des Menschen. Der Mensch ist ein zoon logon echon. Kartesianische Vereinfachung und Sprache. Die Aufgabe von Ereignis und logos in der Sprache. Bedeutung für die heutigen Medien.

Die Sprache wird von „Versammlung in Ereignis“¹⁰ gebildet. Diese merkwürdig klingenden Worte verlangen eine Erklärung, denn hierin befindet sich der höchste Sinn und Zweck der Sprache. Durch die Sprache wird die Welt in ihrer ungeheuerlichen und unabsehbaren Größe zu etwas, das mit mir (mit uns) in der vertrauten Zusammengehörigkeit der harmonischen Verbindung, Gemeinschaft steht. Durch die Sprache werden meine Ichheit und die Welt, in der ich mich befinde, zu etwas, was beieinander steht, was also in einem einfachen und freundschaftlichen Zusammensein „versammelt“ ist. Die Welt steht dann meiner Winzigkeit, Unscheinbarkeit und Überflüssigkeit nicht mehr als das gegenüber, das die Form von Tiamata hat, also einem Schlund, der mich jederzeit verschlingen und vollkommen vernichten kann. Sprache versammelt in eine einfache Einheit, in ein freundschaftliches Zusammensein.

Sprache ist das größte Geschenk, das dem Menschen gegeben wurde. Jedes Wort hat eine unabsehbare Tiefe, deshalb kann ein Wort nicht als Zeichen verstanden werden. So ist es in einigen analytischen Auffassungsweisen der Sprache und des Sprechens. Genau diese Zeichenhaftigkeit der Sprache sollten wir konsequent problematisieren, darauf hinweisen, dass hier die schwierigsten Probleme der heutigen Kommunikation verborgen sind. Wir wissen, dass Sprache nur auf der Grundlage dessen, wodurch sie wesentlich begründet ist, verstanden werden kann, und zwar durch die Ontologie des Sprechers. Falls der Sprecher Kartesianer ist, kann ein Wort für ihn nichts anderes als ein Zeichen sein, die Sprache ist für ihn nur dazu da, dass die Menschen sich verständigen können, und zwar vor Allem auf dem Markt, denn die Agora ist doch schon seit den ältesten antiken Zeiten der Raum für die gegenseitige Verständigung der Menschen.

¹⁰ Heidegger, M. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Tübingen:Verlag Günter Neske Pfullingen 1959, S. 12.

Sich mit der Welt „versammeln“ ist nichts anderes, als dieses Hegelsche sich selbst in einem anderen zu finden und sich dort absolut zu finden, es ist nichts anderes als das Heideggersche Ereignis. Das Ereignis ist also nichts Geheimnisvolles. Es handelt sich nur um das ursprüngliche griechische logos von λεγειν, was genau diese „Versammlung zu einer einfachen Einheit“ bedeutet. Das Ereignis als das Auffinden von sich selbst in einem anderen ist genau das, was Philosophen seit jeher suchen. Es handelt sich um die innige Beziehung zur Allheit, die nichts anderes bedeutet als die ursprüngliche Form der Liebe, aus der diese so oft wiederholte Verwunderung und dieses Erstaunen entspringen, aus denen die ganze Philosophie als Liebe zur Weisheit entstanden ist. Die Sprache ist jenes Wunder, durch das der „Mensch“ als Mensch entstanden ist. Darum muss die Sprache gepflegt werden, und nur dank dieser Funktion der Sprache in unserem Leben ist die Pflege der Sprache der Grundstein der Pflege der Seele (Epimeleia). Nur dank der Sprache verbinden wir uns mit der Gesamtheit der Welt, mit dem Kosmos, wir werden zu Wesen mit Persönlichkeit, wir sind Personen. Falls ein Mensch irgendwo ohne Sprache erzogen wird, übersteigt er seinen Horizont nicht zur Gemeinschaft hin, er kann nicht „Zoon politikon“ sein. Darum ist jede mechanische Verwendung der Sprache immer ein Beweis, dass der Mensch seine Beziehung zur grenzenlosen Ganzheit verloren hat. So ein Mensch sieht in seiner Umgebung nur einzelne Dinge und die Beziehungen zwischen ihnen, dh. er weiß nichts von der Gesamtheit, er hat kein Arete, wie die alten Griechen sagen würden. Jede handwerkliche und mechanische Bezugnahme zu Wörtern und Sätzen ist nur der Beweis über den Verlust der Gesamtheit. Das ist in unserer kartesischen Zeit auch geschehen. Wir sind Menschen, die meist nicht von der Gesamtheit wissen. Darum sind wir in den Sinn der Beschaffung als ausschließliche Beziehung zu den Sachen in unserer Umgebung vertieft, diese Intention durchdringt alle unsere einzelnen Tätigkeiten im alltäglichen Leben. Wir wissen nicht, dass wir den Sinn des Ganzen verloren haben, wir wollen es nicht wissen. Warum? Weil uns das in der Ausübung unserer Funktionalitäten stört, von denen wir überzeugt sind, dass sie jene Substanz sind, ohne die unser Leben nicht möglich wäre. Das Wort wird zu einem flachen Geräusch oder einer flachen Aufschrift. Später geht aus dieser „Flachheit“ ein einziger Sinn des Wortes hervor, und das ist das Zeichen. Das Wort wird zu einem Zeichen, einem Sinnbild (Sema). In ihrer Dreieinigkeit durch Semantik, Pragmatik und Syntax wurde die Semiologie zur Wissenschaft der Wissenschaften. Die Syntax ist dann die Grundlage von Programmen, in denen statt Wörtern, Sätzen und deren Bedeutungen Kombinationen von Einsen und Nullen auftreten. Wir befinden uns im Reich der Mechanisierung, Handwerklichkeit, im Reich der Logik. Das Wort hat seine Tiefe, seine Höhe verloren, es ist nur ein flaches Zeichen.

Warum kann aus der Sprache vieles verstanden werden? Weil die Sprache in sich das Wesen des Menschen zum Sein verbirgt. Jede lebendige Sprache ist der Beweis darüber, wie die Menschen, die diese Sprache benutzen, sich auf die Totalität des Seins überhaupt beziehen. Wir wissen es nicht, aber in der Verwendung der Sprache verbirgt sich unser größtes Geheimnis, das, wie wir eigentlich sind. Hier verbirgt sich unsere Ontologie, die wir „leben“, ohne sie sinnvoll aussprechen zu können oder zu vermögen. Wenn wir unsere eigene Ontologie aussprechen könnten, wären wir schon woanders und unsere Sprache wäre Zeuge unserer Kultivierung, die wir Bildung nennen. Aber die Gegenwart bietet nur Handwerk, technische Fertigkeiten, der Sinn der Gesamtheit interessiert sie nicht. Darin verbirgt sich eine gewisse Niedrigkeit unserer Bildung.

Die Sprache ist das, wodurch wir uns selbst mit der Welt und mit dem ganzen Sein verbinden. Falls Tiere keine Sprache haben, so bleiben sie nur mit ihrer Umgebung verbunden, und zwar nur aufgrund ihrer biologischen Bedürfnisse. Sie besitzen nicht die Fähigkeit, sich zur Totalität des ganzen Anderen zu „verfügen“ und sich selbst in Verbindung mit dem Rest der Welt wahrzunehmen, in einer Verbindung, die Einfachheit ist, die vertrauensvoll, liebevoll und freundschaftlich ist. Die Beziehung muss schon in der Kindheit und unter dem Taktstock des Zuhauses erlebt werden, mit Mutter, Vater, Oma und Opa. Das Zuhause ist der Ort der ersten Anheimwerdung mit der Gesamtheit der Welt, aber die Welt ist hier noch klein, es ist eine Welt, in deren Mittelpunkt das Zuhause ist, Mutter und Vater. Es handelt sich um die erste Lebensbewegung nach Patočka. Das Zuhause mit dem Anker der Eltern ist die „Totalität“ der Welt des Kindes. Es ist die süßeste [Zeit] im ganzen Leben, falls das "Zuhause" gelungen ist. Meist fehlt aber einer der beiden, die Eltern lassen sich scheiden, können die Folgen ihrer Entscheidung, eine Familie zu gründen und zusammen zu leben, nicht ertragen. Dann prägt sich aber immer etwas Negatives in die Seele des kleinen Kindes ein, was dann in weitere Entscheidungen, in das ganze Leben durchdringt. Aber das weiß man heute schon, das ahnt man heute schon. Jetzt ist hier aber die Sprache, die viele negative Folgen von unvollständigen Familien, von unvollständigem Zuhause teilweise heilen kann. Durch die Sprache kommen wir bis zur Transzendenz, wir müssen unsere Alltäglichkeit nicht nur in der Reszendenz erleben, also dort, wo die Gültigkeit des ausschließlichen Seins nur Wesenheiten und deren Bedeutungen für den Menschen zusteht. Während uns die Hand auf dem Weg durch die Dinge führt, ist die Sprache eine verlängerte Hand, sie führt uns bis hinter den Horizont, sie führt uns dorthin, wo wir keine Formen mehr wahrnehmen, wo wir uns nicht mehr an Dingen, die „clare et distincte“ sind, anhalten können, und trotzdem wissen, dass hier noch etwas ist. Aber dieses „ist“ ist nicht dasselbe wie das „ist“ bei Sachen in Raum und Zeit bei Wesenheiten.

Falls der Mensch ein Wesen ist, durch das das Leben der Erde fließt, falls der Mund wirklich nur der Ort sind, an dem die Erde aufblüht, dann ist die Hand der Ort, an dem die Erde mit den Wesenheiten in Interaktion tritt, die im Sinne der „Vorhandenheit“ (vor den Händen) und im Sinne der „Zuhandenheit“ (zu Handen, also zur Nutzung) vor uns sind. Worte sind versammelnde Weisungen, die auf diese Wesenheiten hinzeigen und hinter den Horizont, zum Sein selbst, zeigen. Zu „zeigen“ und durch das Zeigen zu "verbinden", das ist der Sinn von Wörtern. Wörter sind nicht nur Zeichen für die systematische Nutzung der menschlichen Kraft für die Arbeit und das Leben. Wörter sind Weisungen zur Verbindung mit dem Rest der Welt, mit dem Sein selbst. Und eben dieser zeigende Impetus (*Vorwärtsdrängen, Anm. d. Übers.*) wurde durch die heutige Existenz zu einer bloßen Zeichenhaftigkeit reduziert, zu Elementen in einem im Voraus erforschten System von Beziehungen auf dem Gebiet der Semiologie.

Sagen kann man ohne Worte, sprechen nur mit Worten. Tote sagen vieles. Sie sagen es uns durch die Stille. „Sagen“ heißt „zeigen“, und die Toten zeigen uns auf jenes hin, was wir während ihres Lebens nicht wahrhaben wollten. Sie wecken in uns unsere alten Verschuldungen und wir wissen auf einmal, dass wir ein Gewissen haben. Alles zeigt sich auf dem Hintergrund des Nichts, auf dem Hintergrund des Seins. Das Sein ist so voll seiner Leere, es ist der beste Hintergrund zum Zeigen überhaupt. Und dieser Hintergrund zeigt sich nur in der Stille, darum gilt, dass die Stille klingt und manchmal auch schmerzhaft laut ist.

Zum Sagen gehört Schmerz. Was ist Schmerz? Schmerz ist eine Fuge, eine Lücke, er ist „*der Unterschied selbst*“, ¹¹ sagt Heidegger. Schmerz ist das Hinzeigen auf etwas, das aus einem Ganzen, wohin es gehört, ausfallen möchte. Wenn uns irgendein Körperteil schmerzt, dann möchte dieser Teil das Ganze des Körpers verlassen, er möchte die Ordnung der Isonomie verlassen. Isonomie bedeutet dasselbe Gesetz für alle Körperteile. Dieses einheitliche Gesetz herrscht immer, es handelt sich darum, was immer herrscht. Und das ist der Beginn, zu dem die alten Griechen „arché“ sagten. Arché herrscht allerdings, da es der Anfang ist, und der Anfang fängt immer wieder an, er entsteht also wieder und wieder. Die Grundlage der Gesundheit ist dieses arché, das nicht chemisch begründet werden kann. Uns wurde das gegeben, das unser Anfang ist.

Oligarchie ist die Bezeichnung für die Herrschaft Neureicher, reicher Menschen in der betreffenden Polis. Die Arché in uns selbst ist etwas, was wir uns nicht selbst gegeben haben, im Gegenteil, wir haben es von unseren Vorfahren geerbt, vor Allem von den Eltern. Der Anfang ist das Höchste – das lesen wir in alten Philosophien und auch in

¹¹ Heidegger, M. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Tübingen: Verlag Günter Neske Pfullingen 1959, S. 27.

Heideggers Werk sehr oft. Warum? Weil er uns beherrscht. Wie? Indem er unentwegt wieder und wieder geboren wird und nicht hergestellt, konstruiert werden kann. Es sind heute nur einige Journalisten, die denken, dass wir den Anfang „fangen“, umgehen können, sie sprechen z. B. von der Unsterblichkeit als einer begründeten Möglichkeit der heutigen Wissenschaft. Schmerz ist also ein Hinweis auf etwas, das für uns sehr wichtig ist. Und dieser Hinweis ist ein Sagen, gehört also in die Sprache. Diese Möglichkeit ist den sprachlichen, semiologischen Forschungen im Sinne einer ausgearbeiteten Semiotik, Pragmatik und Syntax unbekannt. Hier handelt es sich immer um „sprechen“, nicht um „sagen“. Wir wollen nur darauf hinweisen, dass die Medien auch etwas sagen, wenn sie schweigen. Denn das Schweigen ist ein Hinweis auf das, was unwichtig ist, was nicht seiend ist, worüber es nicht sinnvoll ist zu überlegen und wesentlich nachzudenken. Mit anderen Worten gesagt, die Medien zeigen den Unterschied zwischen dem Wichtigen und dem Unwichtigen auch dadurch auf, worüber sie schweigen. Darum erlangen sie eine so große Macht über uns alle. Darum ist es auch unausweichlich zu verstehen, dass das Zeigen der ursprüngliche Sinn der Sprache ist, nicht nur das Benennen, so wie wir es heute glauben. Und gerade in diesen Zusammenhängen verbirgt sich der Radix, die radikale Quelle aller Probleme in der Kommunikation. Diese Probleme können nicht durch irgendwelche neuen Angewohnheiten beseitigt werden, die mechanischen Charakter hätten, sondern es geht um etwas grundlegenderes, das nicht so einfach zu ändern ist. Es geht um unsere Beziehung zum Sein. Hier ist der Radix all dieser Probleme. Aber dieser Radix wird in der heutigen Zeit nur selten entdeckt und verstanden.

Aus phänomenologischer Hinsicht ist es sehr wichtig, wie die Funktion eines Wortes entsteht, Dinge zu benennen und zu bezeichnen. Und wie es in solchen Fällen meistens ist, gilt auch hier der alte Grundsatz "nichts neues unter der Sonne" (*in etwa "das hatten wir alles schon mal", Anm. d. Übers.*). Es geht um das Versammeln des Vielen in Eines, um *legein*, um *logos* im ursprünglichen Sinne. Dieses Wort wird von vielen Menschen verwendet und immer richtig, denn immer geht es um die Versammlung der Vielheit in die Ein(fach)heit. Genau diese Funktion ist in der untersten Bedeutungsebene dieses Wortes inhärent. Jedes Wort ist versammelnd, macht aus dem Seienden die Anwesenheit. Und so versammelt das Wort „Baum“ alle einzelnen Baumarten in sich, sogar auch die, die wir nie gesehen haben und die wir gar nicht kennen, vielleicht auf anderen Planeten, in anderen Welten. Diese Versammlung ist, im Grunde und einfach gesagt, das allerwichtigste in unserem menschlichen Leben. Das Ziel von *Epimeleia* (der Pflege der Seele) ist eigentlich nichts anderes. *Epimeleia* möchte aus unserem Leben eine Einfachheit machen, die wie ein Bergkristall von allen Seiten funkelnd klar, aber trotzdem hart, beständig und unverletzlich ist. So soll die Seele eines kultivierten Menschen aussehen, der "ariston", der Beste, ist. Wir müssen uns zu einem

„Bergkristall“ machen, der alle anderen Minerale und Gegenstände durch seine Härte übertrifft. Trotzdem müssen wir klare und einfache Wesen sein. Es ist notwendig, dass sich in uns, wie in einem Spiegel, die ganze Welt widerspiegelt, damit sie in uns treten und sich in uns versammeln kann, eben mit der Hilfe von Worten und „Worten“ dieser Worte. Es ist notwendig, dass die Länge und Breite dieser Allheit ihren Mittelpunkt in unserer Seele finden, die unendlich ist und keinen Boden, keine Grenzen hat. Sie ist versammelnd im Sinne der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes „legein“. Die Seele ist bis heute ein Rätsel. Sie ist kein Gehirn, kein umgrenzter Teil in uns selbst, (...).


Verwendete Literatur:

Heidegger, M. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Tübingen: Verlag Günter Neske Pfullingen 1959, S. 27.

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Riccardo Sirello

Philosophie et media



XVIII. Internationaler PhilosophieKongreß
30. Oktober und 01. November 2009

Association Internationale des Professeurs de Philosophie
Leusden (NL)
Internationale School Wijsbegeerte

**IDENTITY: NATIONAL, EUROPEAN OR GLOBAL?
HOW PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHY TEACHING CAN CONTRIBUTE TO GET
MEANINGFUL IDENTITIES**

Philosophie et media
Philosophie und Medien - Philosophy and media

Prof. Dr. Riccardo SIRELLO - riccardo.sirello@istruzione.it - riccardo.sirello@itance.com

LA COMMUNICATION AUDIOVISUELLE

- ❖ **Transport des images et du son - autonome ou associé - sur les différents médias:** télévision, Internet, Mobiles, vidéoconférences etc.
- ❖ **La diffusion de l'image et du son sur différents réseaux:** des réseaux de radiodiffusion traditionnels à la diffusion sur Internet (aujourd'hui sous forme numérique)
- ❖ **Révolution, bouleversement non seulement technique du son et de l'image:** la révolution digitale -
- ❖ **Psychophysiologie de la vision**

INTERNET

- Objet de recherche -

❖ **Ressources**

❖ **Instrument d'apprentissage à la coopération**

❖ **Communication sociale** - le Monde des états de conscience devenus visibles par autrui (condivision de la Pensée)

❖ **Du Monde de l'audible au Monde du visible** - de l'oral à l'écrit -

On comprend que:

❖ **Technologies de l'information et de la communication, processus cognitifs et formatifs**

❖ **Souveraineté de l'action de penser et de communiquer** - information et support -

❖ **Savoirs structurés ou "liquides"** (Baumann) - voie d'accès didactique formative -

INTERNET

- Ce que nous savons -

❖ **Pour rechercher des informations**

❖ **Pour échanger des informations**

❖ **Pour télécharger des fichiers ou des applications**

❖ **Pour communiquer en direct** sous support de texte, graphique, audio ou vidéo

On peut ajouter à ces utilisations :

❖ **L'utilisation de l'hypertexte** comme outil didacticiel l'acquisition de données, ainsi que la programmation

❖ **Des pages Web, des pages interactives et d'applets Java**

EXEMPLE DE DIDACTIQUE

www.portalafilosofico.com

www.nuovadiattica.net

EXEMPLE DE DIDACTIQUE

Recherche en réseau pour enseignants et étudiants – Riccardo Sirello

QUESTIONS

- ❖ Est-il légitime de penser que **la nouvelle technologie (soit les audiovisuelles soit Internet)** se limite à une simple fonction instrumentale? Ou bien devons-nous la repenser autrement?
- ❖ Pour la **Philosophie**? Pour l'**Éducation**? Quels sont les **défis** sur l'identité **nationale**, européenne ou mondiale? - Global interconnected -
- ❖ Quels sont les **défis** face aux nouvelles technologies, défis qui se distinguent des **défis spécifiques représentés surtout par l'accès au réseau d'Internet**?
- ❖ **Internet**: Qu'est-ce que c'est? A quoi peut-il servir? Quelle révolution peut-il engager pour le futur de la **connaissance rationnelle**?

PROBLÈMES

- ❖ **Interconnexion -épiphénomène** - ni espace ni temps précis - réseau de réseaux- ressources -manipulation de symboles - information
- ❖ **Internet pourrait affecter la connaissance rationnelle** - (ce que nous ne savons pas)
- ❖ **Paradoxalement il favorise l'accroissement de la connaissance** produisant des formes d'ignorance jamais vues
- ❖ **Il produit de nouvelles formes d'isolement et de discrimination** (élitisme électronique, technologique) et en même temps un espace intellectuel d'une connaissance rationnelle disséminée dans le temps.
- ❖ **Il transforme conceptions et habitudes**, une culture orientée vers l'objet, les copies hypertexte, la bibliothèque virtuelle, l'encyclopédie numérique et en même temps un parricide digital (perte de l'information sur papier)
- ❖ **Notre manière de penser pourrait à long terme se modifier**, à mesure que le **raisonnement relationnel et associatif** s'impose au détriment de *l'analyse linéaire* procédant par inférences, et que la *pensée visualisée* apparaît à nouveau au moins aussi importante que les *processus symboliques*. Navigation à travers un espace personnel.

Programm – Programme – Program

Wie die Philosophie und der Philosophieunterricht zu unseren Identitäten beitragen können

Comment la philosophie et l'enseignement de la philosophie peuvent contribuer à gagner nos identités

How philosophy and philosophy teaching can contribute to get meaningful identities

Die philosophische Reflektion gilt der europäischen Tradition und Zukunft unserer Weltgemeinschaft. Genügt das Leitmotiv der Europäischen Union, politische und soziale Werte zu schaffen, oder brauchen wir auch kulturelle Werte für eine europäische Identität? Haben religiöse Werte noch ein Platz in einer europäischen Zivilgesellschaft? Wie verstehen wir die Multikulturalität? Bedeutet unsere Freiheit, dass wir Verantwortung tragen, unsere eigenen Traditionen zu verteidigen? Wie vertragen sich kosmopolitische Identität und das klassische Ideal der humanistischen Bildung? Ist eine mehrfache oder multiple Identität möglich?

Identität ist ein aktuelles kontroverses Thema geworden. Gibt es eine soziale Identitätskrise? Wenn es diese Krise gibt, ist sie nur eine Denkkategorie oder bittere Wirklichkeit? Wird Identität sozial produziert oder ist sie etwas Authentisches?

Le sujet de la réflexion philosophique de notre congrès est la tradition européenne et l'avenir de notre société mondiale. La question est, si, selon le leitmotiv de la UE, il suffit de créer des valeurs politiques et sociales ou si nous avons besoin aussi des valeurs culturelles pour obtenir une identité européenne. Des valeurs religieuses, ont-elles encore d'importance dans une société civile européenne? Comment pouvons-nous comprendre une société, qui contient des cultures différentes ? Dans le cadre dans notre liberté, nous faut-il défendre nos propres traditions à cause de notre responsabilité? Comment l'identité cosmopolite et l'idéal classique d'une formation humaniste sont-elles compatibles? Est-ce qu'une identité multiforme ou multiple est possible ?

L'identité est devenue un sujet actuel et controversé. Est-ce qu'il y a une crise sociale de l'identité? S'il y a une telle crise, est-elle seulement une catégorie de penser ou une réalité dure? L'identité est-elle produite par les sociétés ou est-elle quelque chose d'authentique?

One part of philosophical reflection is directed to European tradition and the future of our world community. It is a central theme of EU to create political and social values. Is that enough or do we require cultural values for a European identity as well? Do religious values still have room in a European civil society? How do we understand multiculturalism? Does our freedom include our responsibility to defend our own tradition? How does a cosmopolitan identity go with the classical ideal of a humanistic education? Is a double or multiple identity possible?

Identity is a current controversial topic. Is there a crisis of social identity? In case of "yes": Is it only a category of reasoning or a bitter reality? Is identity a product of social life or something authentic.

Freitag – vendredi – Friday, 30.10.2009

14.00 – 14.20

Begrüßung, Paroles de bienvenue, Welcome
Miriam van Reijen
Werner Busch

14.20- 15. 20

Prof. Drs. Paul Scheffer (Univ. Amsterdam): Lecture
Identity, philosophy and the Dutch tradition

15.45 – 16.45

Prof. Dr. Gabriele Münnix (Univ. Münster): Lecture
Intercultural Philosophy and Multiperspectivity

16.45 – 17.30 Debate

19. 30 – 20.00 Videopräsentation – présentation vidéo - videopresentation:
Philosophieunterricht in den Niederlanden/ l'enseignement de philosophie dans les Pays Bas – philosophy teaching in the Netherlands.

20.00- 21. 30:

A. Philosophieren mit Kinder / Philosophy with children
Ed Weijers, (Zentrum für Kinder Philosophie, Niederlande)

B. Philosophie für Jungeren/ studenten/ philosophy at highschool
Joan de Ruijter Mitglied der VFVO: (Verein der Niederländische Philosophie Dozenten an Hochschule)

Sonnabend – samedi – Saturday, 31.10. 2009

9.00 – 10.00

Dr. Vera Anatol'evna Gnevasheva (Moskou) : Lecture
Die Wertvorstellungen russischer Jugendlicher – Les valeurs de la jeunesse russe – The values of Russian youngsters

10.30 – 12.30

A. Philosophy with younger pupils (12-16 jr.) in lower professional and technical education/ in einfaches technisch/berufsunterrichts)
Nelson Hoedekie (VEFO = Verein der Belgische Philosophie Dozenten)

B. The Art of Discussion or Discussion as Art – Die Kunst der Diskussion oder Diskussion als Kunst – L'art de discussion ou la discussion comme art
Piotr Wojciechowski (Poland)

14.00 – 15.30:

A. Philosophie und Ethik im Verhältnis zum ReligionsUnterricht
Bernd Rolf (Deutschland)

B. Interkulturelles Philosophieren/inter-or transcultural philosophy
Herman Lodewijckx (Belgien)

16.00 – 17.30:

A. Philosophie und Medien/ Philosophy and media
Ricardo Sirello (Italien)

B. Philosophie in Verhältnisse mit Bildung und gesellschaftlicher Interesse an Effizienz, Versachlichung und Planning – Philosophy related to Formation and Public Interest in Efficency, Objectivation and Planning – La philosophie en relation avec la formation et l'intérêt public pour l'efficacité, fonctionnement et planification
Pekka Elo (Finland)

20.00 – 2030 Musik Intermezzo

20.30 – 22.00

A. Philosophie für Erwachsenen / Doing philosophy with adults
Kristof van Rossem (Belgien)

B. Philosophie für Erwachsenen / doing philosophy with adults
Peter Harteloh (VFP = Niederländische Verein der Praktisierende Philosophen)

Sonntag – dimanche - Sunday, 1.11. 2009

9.00 – 10.00

Prof. Dr. Ricardo Pozzo (Univ. Verona): Lecture

Philosophy teaching in the world – reality, problems, projects

10.30 – 12.30

A. Die vielfältige Tradition der Philosophie in Europa – The Manifold Tradition of Philosophy in Europe – La tradition pluridimensionnelle de la philosophie en Europe
Franz Schüppen (Deutschland)

B. Interkulturelles Philosophieren/inter-or transcultural philosophy
Gabrielle Münnix (Deutschland)

Besuch – visite – visit Kröller Muller Museums



Association Internationale des Professeurs de Philosophie

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